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BOOK REVIEWS
works. This of course is in a sense a defense not only of what is re-
ported in the present volume but of the entire University of Chicago
jury study project. It is an argument that it is better to do a bit of
discreet tampering with judicial processes, with a minimum of inter-
ference or practically no interference with their actual operation,
than it is to remain in ignorance of how they actually operate, and
that this is particularly true when a body of untested legend has
grown up around a portion of the judicial process concerning which
there are vigorous demands for reform. The point is that purported
reforms based on ignorance are as unwise as lethargy based on igno-
rance. The acquisition of reliable information should be a prerequisite
to either action or inaction.
Delay in the Court serves as a model for the acquisition of such
information. It specifically provides the information as to one par-
ticular area, it describes a technique whereby other congested court
systems can be studied in the same manner to the same end, and it
provides inspiration for other studies of equal quality on other aspects
of the judicial process. That is a great deal for one small book to do.
ROBERT A. LEFLARt
THE GREAT LEGAL PHILOSOPHERS. Edited by Clarence Morris,
Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1959. Pp. 571. $9.00.
Two decades ago the teacher of jurisprudence had little choice of
materials for class use unless he was willing to take the heroic step
of gathering his own. Professor Hall's pioneer Readings in Jurispru-
dence (1938) apparently demonstrated a need which could be satisfied
in various ways and induced the casebook press, and jurisprudence
teachers generally, to bring out the same profuse offerings that had
long confronted teachers in more routine fields. Since that time we
have had readings by Cohen and Cohen, Fuller, Simpson and Stone,
Snyder, and Dr. Wu, besides textbooks by Julius Stone and by E. W.
Patterson. With this variety of choices for a course that seldom, I
suppose, enrolls students in great numbers, the publishers must have
incurred losses, and one would think that even tastes as peculiar as
jurisprudence teachers' must have been satiated. And this raises the
question whether there was need for Professor Morris' The Great
Legal Philosophers. In my opinion, little promising as the prospect
may have seemed, there was. This book consists of extracts from
twenty-two of the greatest philosophers and legal philosophers, and
reaches from Aristotle to Roscoe Pound. The arrangement is sub-
stantially chronological, so that after Aristotle each philosopher writes
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in the context of his predecessors. Nearly every one of the writers is
represented by enough material for the reader to draw at least some
critical conclusions and to decide his own preferences. None of the
preceding readings, so far as I know, followed precisely this genetic
arrangement, or offered this historical perspective, while including
enough of each writer to exhibit his general view of law and legal
philosophy. In Hall and to a smaller degree in Cohen and Cohen, the
arrangement is partly chronological, but the extracts are briefer, and
include many more writers, so that, necessarily, none of them are
covered as thoroughly as the twenty-two in Professor Morris' book.
Consequently, I think the statement holds that this book offers a selec-
tion enough different from others to make it a worth while addition
to the materials in the field. Indeed, for the teacher (and student)
who definitely prefers a historical approach it is likely to be the best
of all.
The philosophers have been well chosen to bring out the various
battles of ideas that have raged and are raging in legal philosophy.
The absence of Plato is something to regret, but Plato offers the com-
piler nearly impossible choices, for he must either pick scraps that are
nearly unintelligible standing alone, or print huge sections of The
Republic and The Laws. Even in a book as large as this Aristotle is
almost a necessary preference. At any rate, with Aristotle, Aquinas,
Locke, Kant, and Hegel, the schools of idealism are well represented.
Hobbes and Hume, on the other hand, have their chance to develop the
empirical criticism of idealist theories. The arrangement permits one
to follow the argument from Hobbes to Locke, and from Hume to
Kant, and then to observe, for example, the clashes of Bentham with
Kant on the one hand and Savigny on the other. Professor Morris
has included enough of the ethical theories and the critiques of them
to keep the crucial moral questions constantly before the reader's eyes
and to raise in his mind over and over again the problems of the
relation between ethics and law. In teaching the book I have found
the students at least as concerned about the ethical questions as about
the purely legal ones.
Extracts from Austin represent the positive school, from Ehrlich
the institutional, and from Dabin the Neo-Thomist school. Holmes,
Dewey, Cardozo and Pound are the American representatives. This
list of writers is not exhaustive, but it is enough to show the scope of
the offering.
As its title suggests, the book contains legal philosophers; its em-
phasis is not modern,-rather, it stresses the recurrent problems, and
the development of ideas. This is one of many perfectly valid objec-
tives of a course in jurisprudence, and with this criterion in mind the
book is a very good one. Professor Morris has been particularly happy
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in his selection of passages that bring out the shifts in emphasis and
the conflicts in ideas from age to age, philosopher to philosopher.
Among the many books of readings now available this one, it seems
to me, would be perhaps the best beginning for the practicing lawyer
who wishes to study the philosophic background of the material of his
profession. Such a reader, who is proceeding more or less at his own
will, might well delay his study of the current writers, while he ac-
quaints or re-acquaints himself with the classics of the field. The
length of the extracts from each writer would give him a good chance
to discover what men stir his imagination and are worth his further
study. Not entirely incidentally, the book is beautifully printed on
large double-columned pages and is provided with an index that looks
impressively complete and usable.
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